Vali Convalescent and Care Institutions, a Utah Corporation v. Utah Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing : Reply Brief of Respondent/Cross-Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
Vali Convalescent and Care Institutions, a Utah
Corporation v. Utah Department of Health,
Division of Health Care Financing : Reply Brief of
Respondent/Cross-Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Brian L. Farr; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for Cross-
Appellant/Respondent.
Spencer E. Austin; Julia C. Attwood; Parsons, Behle & Latimer; Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Vali Convalescent and Care Institutions v. Utah Department of Health, No. 880434 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1251
onmr 
JTfi.H 
)0-;otV€NT 
C J- U 
;0 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
, f t L C T . , n Qft /X#*fcU~rA OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VALI CONVALESCENT AND 
CARE INSTITUTIONS, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
-vs-
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE 
FINANCING, 
Respondent/Cross Appellant. 
Case No. 880434-CA 
Priority No. 14a 
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/CROSS APPELLANT 
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY, 
PRESIDING 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
BRIAN L. FARR 
Assistant Attorney General 
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
P.O. Box 45011 
Telephone: 538-1020 
Attorneys for Respondent/ 
Cross Appellant 
SPENCER E. AUSTIN 
JULIA C. ATTWOOD 
of and for p™ i i sn=> «^ 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER I I L t U 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
185 South State, Suite 700 JUL12198H 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 m^irimom^ 
Telephone: 532-1234 (^taffi**** court 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VALI CONVALESCENT AND 
CARE INSTITUTIONS, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
-vs-
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE 
FINANCING, 
Respondent/Cross Appellant. 
Case No. 880434-CA 
Priority No. 14a 
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/CROSS APPELLANT 
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY, 
PRESIDING 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
BRIAN L. FARR 
Assistant Attorney General 
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
P.O. Box 45011 
Telephone: 538-1020 
Attorneys for Respondent/ 
Cross Appellant 
SPENCER E. AUSTIN 
JULIA C. ATTWOOD 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
185 South State, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: 532-1234 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
INTRODUCTION 1 
REPLY TO VALI' S FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 6 
SUPPLEMENTAL FACTS 9 
ARGUMENT 11 
I. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS THE 
RESULT OF COMPROMISE ON THE PART 
OF BOTH PARTIES 11 
II. VALI DID NOT RESERVE A CLAIM 
FOR INTEREST 12 
III. IT IS THE MARCH 22, 1985 AGREEMENT 
THAT IS CONTROLLING AND THAT AGREEMENT 
WAS FOR COMPLETE AND FINAL SETTLEMENT 16 
CONCLUSION 19 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960 (Utah App. 1988) 2 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 2,3,6 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-6-1 2,3,5 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-23-2 2 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
15a Am Jr 2d Compromisise and Settlement §§ 24, 25 20-21 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
BRIAN L. FARR (1037) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor 
P.O. Box 45011 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 538-4660 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VALI CONVALESCENT AND 
CARE INSTITUTIONS, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
-vs-
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE 
FINANCING, 
Respondent/Cross Appellant. 
Case No. 880434-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/CROSS APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
Vali begins its Reply/Response Brief (i.e., Response to 
the cross appeal) with an assertion that "[a]s support for the 
great majority of its alleged facts, DOH cites to its own briefs 
filed in the lower court..." (Vali Reply Brief, p. 1), when in 
fact, DOH cites to its own brief in only 3 out of 29 statements 
of fact. (i.e., Fact Nos- 7, 8 & 9 in DOH Brief). Certainly, 3 
out of 29 is not a "great majority." Furthermore, none of those 
three facts is critical to the issues before the Court but rather 
were only provided in an effort to assist the Court in 
understanding the background to the dispute and to counter 
statements in Vali's brief that DOH believes are unsupported and 
inaccurate, if not false. Moreover, Vali did not object to those 
statements in the District Court and Vali does not seriously 
disagree with those Statements of Fact in its response to them on 
page 9 of its Reply Brief herein. 
In the introduction in its reply brief Vali also 
contends "that a number of facts are now in issue that never were 
in issue before." Vali then attempts to use that contention as 
justification to present alleged facts that are not in the 
record. Vali also appears to be attempting to confuse the issues 
in its efforts to get a remand to the district court. "The 
purpose of a brief is to enlighten the court and elucidate the 
issues rather than confuse the court and obscure the issues." 
Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960 (Utah App. 1988). 
There are no new issues of fact in this case. The only 
issues raised by Vali on this appeal are: 
1. Whether Vali has a right to interest under Utah 
Code Ann. § 15-1-1, when the principal sum is resolved by the 
parties without entry of judgment; andf 
2. Whether Vali has a right to interest under Utah 
Code Ann. § 15-6-1. 
DOH does cite documentary evidence that was attached as an 
exhibit to its brief in an additional 5 statements of fact (i.e., 
Nos. 13-17) but even 8 out of 29 is not a "great majority." 
Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. § 26-23-2(4) (1984) allows the 
District Court to admit additional evidence and Vali did not 
object to those documents when they were submitted. Moreover, 
those documents are not critical to the issues before the Court 
but were provided principally to help the Court understand the 
background. 
The first issue presents no questions of fact but rather only-
presents two questions of law, i.e., whether Utah Code Ann. § 15-
1-1 provides a statutory right to interest at all, and if so 
whether that right extends to provide an entitlement to interest 
on amounts that are resolved by the parties without entry of 
judgment (or as in this case without litigation at all). 
The second issue raised by Vali presents only one 
question of fact, i.e., whether there was a dispute between the 
parties (because Utah Code Ann. § 15-6-1 et seq. does not apply 
if there was a dispute). Hence, the only issue of fact that is 
relevant to Vali's issues is whether there was a dispute and that 
is not a new issue. 
The only issue raised by DOH on appeal is whether the 
parties settlement agreement of March 22, 1985 bars or otherwise 
renders Vali's later claim for interest unenforceable for the 
period prior to the settlement. While that is principally a 
question of law it also involves an issue of fact as to whether 
the compromised amount was a final settlement or merely a 
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settlement of principal. Again, that is not a new issue. 
It appears that the only other issue of fact is the 
issue raised by Vali that it reserved the right to interest. 
Hence there are no new issues of fact, nor are the 
facts relied on to prove those issues new. The only facts set 
forth in DOH's Statement of Facts that were not clearly argued in 
Both parties argue that there was a settlement that ought to be 
enforced, so there is no issue as to whether there was a 
settlement. The only issue is whether it was "final" or for 
principal only. 
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the District Court are the facts in statements 16 and 17 that 
specify the amount Vali claimed as allowable costs and the 
amounts of the disallowance, and those amounts were taken from 
documents that are in the record. Reference to those facts by 
DOH does not justify Vali's attempt to bring in its alleged facts 
that are not in the record. Furthermore, the Court is not called 
upon to determine the amount of Vali's claim or of the 
disallowance. Those facts are not in issue in this case (nor 
even in dispute as far as DOH is aware). 
Nor do the statements made in DOH's "Response To Vali's 
Statement Of Facts," raise new issues of fact. They are merely 
DOH's response to statements made by Vali, statements that DOH 
believes to be inaccurate and misleading. Moreover, most of 
DOH's responses are tied directly to the record and cite what 
documents actually say rather than what Vali claims they say. 
Not only does DOH's Response To Vali's Statement Of 
Facts not raise any new issues of fact, for the most part it 
doesn't even refer to facts that are in issue. It merely gives 
DOH's response to statements made by Vali that are not in issue. 
The Court is not asked to determine how Medicaid rates were 
calculated, or to even understand them for that matter. The 
Court is not asked to determine whether Vali was really treated 
as badly as it claims it was by the Department of Public Safety, 
Bureau of Medicaid Fraud. Nor is the court asked to determine 
whether the Medicaid Fraud investigation found no evidence to 
support charges of fraud, as claimed by Vali, or only whether 
there was insufficient evidence as stated by the prosecutor. 
_A_ 
None of those matters are in issue. They have nothing 
to do with Vali's claim that it has a statutory right to 
interest. Nor do they seem relevant to DOH's claim that the 
settlement precludes interest. Vali apparently threw them in as 
an attempt to gain the Court's sympathy by making it appear that 
Vali was in innocent victim of serious mistreatment. DOH 
believes that if all the facts were before the Court it would be 
clear that if there was any mistreatment of Vali it was by the 
Department of Public safety and not by DOHf that Vali is not 
nearly as innocent as it would have the Court believe it is, and 
that DOH acted in good faith to try to get the matter settled as 
quickly and fairly as possible. But again, those facts are not 
before the Court because these matters are not in issue. 
In summary, there are no new facts in issue. The only 
issues before the Court are Vali's claim that it has a statutory 
right to interest and DOH's claim that even if there were such a 
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right the settlement precludes a later claim for interest. The 
only issues of fact appear to be 
1. Whether there was a dispute that precludes the 
application of Utah Code Ann. § 15-6-1; and 
2. Whether the settlement was final or only a 
settlement of principal. 
There are no new facts in issue and DOH strongly objects to 
Vali's blatant attempt to introduce alleged facts that are not in 
the record and to Vali's attempts to obscure the issues. DOH 
Of course Vali also claims that it has been seeking interest 
pursuant to the common law all along but DOH strongly disagrees. 
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also strongly objects to Vali's misrepresentation of the 
arguments raised by DOH and respectfully requests that the Court 
be careful to evaluate those arguments as presented by DOH rather 
4 
than as characterized by Vali. 
REPLY TO VALI'S FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
While DOH disagrees with many of Vali's statements of 
factf and while DOH believes that many of Vali's statements are 
overstated and others need correction or qualification, DOH also 
believes that most of Vali's statements are not relevant to the 
issues that are before the Court. DOH will therefore not waste 
the Court's time by responding to those statements. There are, 
however, a couple of statements made by Vali that are relevant 
that require a response. 
1. In paragraph 21 of the Statement of Facts in DOH's 
Brief herein DOH states that Vali raised the issue of interest 
for the first time about two weeks after the settlement agreement 
was entered into. (The settlement agreement was the culmination 
of the informal hearing process.) In response to that statement 
of fact Vali claimed that it was ". . .an absolute distortion of 
the record and the facts" (Vali Reply Brief, p. 11) yet Vali's 
Petition for review in the District Court states: "During the 
exit conferences and informal hearings, Vali intentionally did 
not raise the issue of whether interest on amounts found due and 
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As just one example, DOH does not argue that the legislature 
has no power to change the common law as Vali claims. Rather 
DOH's argument was that at the time U.C.A. § 15-1-1 was enacted 
there was already a right to interest under the common law so 
there was no need to create that right. There was however 
uncertainty as to what the rate should be and § 15-1-1 simply 
solved that problem by setting the rate. 
owing should be paid by DHCF." (R. 286, paragraph 12). Thus 
DOH's statement was not an "absolute distortion" as claimed by 
Vali but rather was simply a restatement of Vali's claim as to 
when the issue of interest was raised. 
Vali also indicated in its Petition in the District 
Court that the reason it did not raise the issues in the 
conferences and informal hearing was because it intended to raise 
that issue later at a formal hearing (R. 286f paragraph 13). 
Thus Vali did not raise the issue of interest until after 
entering the settlement agreement that culminated the informal 
hearing process. 
2. Vali states in paragraph 25 of its Statement of 
Facts that a meeting regarding interest was held on March 13r 
1985. That date is, of course, prior to the date that DOH claims 
the parties finalized their settlement agreement (March 20/22, 
1985). The meeting actually took place on May 13, 1985, which is 
almost eight weeks after the settlement was finalized. 
(Stipulation of Facts, paragraph 20.) 
3. Contrary to Vali's claim in paragraph 23 of its 
Statement of Facts, DOH did not issue a decision that it owed 
Vali $272,362.03 exclusive of interest. There was no admission 
that DOH "owed" Vali that amount. Rather the informal hearing 
officer made a proposal for "final settlement." It was a 
compromised amount. It was not a proposal for settlement 
"exclusive of interest." It was a proposal for final settlement. 
(Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit H, p. 6). Furthermore, though 
Vali repeatedly refers to amounts DOH owed and continually 
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asserts that the parties settled the principal amount only, there 
is no evidence of either of those allegations in the record. DOH 
did nor agree on a principal amount owed but rather on a 
compromised amount DOH was willing to pay as full and final 
settlement. 
4. In pulling alleged facts from outside the record, 
Vali generated considerable confusion by trying to tie the dollar 
amounts of the disallowance to the dollar amounts of the 
settlement. There is not a dollar for dollar correlation. Once 
the adjustments are made to the disallowance, the figures go 
through the rate making process where they are increased by 
inflation factors, etc. Furthermore, some adjustments affect not 
only the year to which they apply but every year thereafter. 
Hence a compromise of one dollar by DOH on the disallowance may 
result in an increase of substantilly more than that on the 
settlement amount. There are also other factors that affect the 
calculation of the settlement amount. Hence, Vali's use of those 
numbers is not accurate and reliable and DOH disagrees with the 
conclusions Vali draws from those numbers. But againf those 
conclusions are not relevant to the issues that are before the 
Court. 
DOH should also clarify that its claim was not that the 
initial disallowance was for $760,000.00 but that it was in 
excess of that. DOH also became aware that two of the documents 
DOH relied on to arrive at that figure should have been in the 
record but apparently are not. Counsel apologizes to the Court 
for that oversight. 
SUPPLEMENTAL FACTS 
1. In December of 1984, about three months prior to 
the final settlement herein, DOH thought it had finally managed 
to reach a settlement of every issue, except the retro nursing 
issue. Thereafter DOH issued a check to Vali that was intended 
to settle every issue but the retro nursing issue (Stipulation of 
Facts, Exhibit D.) 
2. On February 14, 1985, Mr. Brown, Vali's principal, 
had a discussion with the Acting Director of the DOH Bureau of 
Program Review (the informal hearing officer herein). Mr. Brown 
was apparently uncertain as to just what the settlement check 
represented. (Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit D.) 
3. Under date of February 15, 1985, the informal 
hearing officer wrote a letter to Mr. Brown in which he explained 
that the sum listed on the check was "in fact settlement in full 
for all outstanding issues with the exception of retro nursing." 
The informal hearing officer also explained: 
At this point it appears that there are two 
options. Either you can accept the existing 
warrant as payment in full for all issues 
except retro nursing or you can return the 
warrant and address the issues through the 
hearing process. 
Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit D, paragraph 4. 
4. Mr. Brown chose to return the check. In a letter 
to the informal hearing officer dated February 15, 1985, Mr. 
Brown requested that the informal hearing continue and indicated 
that he would come prepared to finish discussion on the retro 
nursing matter. Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit E and Formal 
Transcript p. 49, In. 1-3. 
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5. A few months later at the formal hearing regardng 
the interest issue Mr. Brown explained why he did not cash the 
check spoken of in the preceding paragraphs. He said the check 
. . . had a severely restrictive endorsement 
on the back that precluded me in our 
estimation of things, precluded us from 
raising other issues that were unresolved in 
our minds; in particular, interest. . . . It 
had language along the lines of "full and 
complete" or "final" so on "settlement for 
any and all issues." . . . I did not want 
the State to have the opportunity to 
preclude a discussion concerning interest. 
Formal Hearing Transcript, p. 49, Ins. 7-10, and 14. 
6. Even though the issue of interest was one of the 
main reasons Mr. Brown did not accept mat check, he did not make 
that known to the informal hearing officer. A few months later 
at the formal hearing, Mr. Brown explained why he did not raise 
the issue of interest with the informal hearing officer. He said 
". . .1 thought, you know, to interject another [issue] to boil 
the pot wasn't particularly, you know, germane to the discussion 
we were having at the time." (Formal Hearing Transcript p. 60 
In. 14-17). He also indicated at the formal hearing that if he 
had raised the issue of interest at the informal hearing he 
thought it might have been more difficult to get a settlement. 
He concluded that if he had raised the issue of interest at the 
informal hearing "I would still have been without any settlement, 
I think, . . . " (Formal Hearing Transcript, p. 61 In. 4-6). 
_1 n^ 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS THE 
RESULT OP COMPROMISE ON THE PART 
OF BOTH PARTIES. 
From the alleged facts Vali submitted that are not in 
the record, Vali would have this Court believe that the 
settlement agreement was not the result of compromise but rather 
was just a matter of Vali providing documentation to support its 
claims. Vali does not tell the Court that a large part of the 
settlement involved compromises on "unallowable" costs, not 
unsupported costs. As one example, such claims as salary and 
benefits to the facility owner that are in excess of Medicaid 
limits are not allowable costs. Furthermore, the record is clear 
that there was a great deal of compromise by both parties. 
In the letter that Mr. Brown sent as acceptance of the 
settlement offer he stated " . . . [t]his settlement, while 
compromised, is a fair one ..." (Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit 
K). At the formal hearing he stated " . . .we had agreed on all 
of the items that were contained in the FCP's that come thorough 
the audit and the exit conferences at that point, and a great 
deal of that was compromise—on both the State's part and my 
part. (Formal Hearing Transcript p. 65, In. 21-25). 
Moreover, in its settlement offer DOH stated that both 
parties reserved the right to raise any of the issues discussed 
at the informal hearing or any related issues not discussed in 
the hearing if the offer was not accepted and the conflict 
resolved at that level. (Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit H, p. 9). 
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In other words both parties made it clear that they were 
retaining the right to unwind all the compromises that they had 
made to that point if they couldn't get a final resolve at that 
level. They could also assert related claims that had not yet 
been raised if the proposal for settlement was not accepted. But 
if the offer was accepted the compromises would stand and all 
claims would be settled. 
POINT II 
VALI DID NOT RESERVE 
A CLAIM FOR INTEREST. 
Almost the entirety of Section IV of Vali's Reply Brief 
is but another example of Vali's twisting and misrepresentation 
of the facts and of DOH's arguments. Vali begins that section by 
stating: 
DOH's entire argument to the effect that the 
settlement of principal bars Vali's claim 
for interest is premised on its utterly 
false representation to this Court that DOH 
was unaware of Vali's intention to claim 
interest until after the "settlement" was 
entered and the principal had been paid. 
Not only did DOH not make a false representation to the Courtf 
DOH is not aware of any representation whatsoever it made to the 
Court regarding whether or not DOH was aware of Vali's intention 
to claim interest. Though Vali had in fact not made it clear 
that Vali claimed to reserve a right to interest, DOH's 
settlement agreement was not premised on such a representation 
but rather on the fact that DOH made an offer for final 
settlement that Vali accepted without reservation. 
Vali's claim that Vali made it clear to DOH very early 
in the negotiations that Vali was not conceding its right to 
claim interest is a new argument that Vali has not raised before. 
If it were really truef it would seem to form the very heart of 
Vali's defense against DOH's claim regarding final settlement, 
yet Vali has not argued it before. 
Vali's argument is based solely on a statement made by 
the DOH audit manager and a statement made by the DOH attorney, 
neither of which statements show that Vali made it clear to DOH 
that Vali was reserving the right to claim interest and would 
assert it after the other matters were settled. Both statements 
were made at the formal hearing. Both statements were taken out 
of context of the respective witnesses testimony as a whole. 
Both witnesses emphatically testified that they considered the 
March 22 settlement to be a final settlement that resolved all 
issues. 
The audit manager's statement was in the form of an 
affirmative response to Vali's attorney's claim that he (Vali's 
attorney) mentioned in an exit conference that Vali might 
preserve an issue of interest. It is not an indication that Vali 
ever did in fact reserve the right to interest prior to the 
settlement. 
The DOH attorney's statement was simply an 
acknowledgment that part of the problem that generated into a 
denial of Vali's acceptance of the $185,000.00 check was whether 
interest should be included in the release. It was not an 
indication that Vali had reserved the right to interest prior to 
that proposed settlement but rather just the opposite. DOH 
clearly considered that the $185,000.00 was for full settlement 
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of all issues but retro nursing, as is set forth above. DOH was 
not aware of any claimed right to reserve the issue of interest 
because Vali had not made such a reservation. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that Vali's attempt 
to get interest on the $185,000.00 settlement amount was 
tantamount to Vali reserving a right to interest in the future. 
Again, quite the opposite is true. Before Vali went back into 
the informal hearing process, DOH (presumably DOH's attorney) 
made it clear to Vali that DOH was not willing to release the 
question of interest to be tried separately. (Formal Hearing 
Transcript p. 75, lines 10-20). DOBUwas simply not willing to 
compromise the issues further and then have Vali claim interest 
on the compromised amount. If Vali wanted to continue with the 
informal process Vali would have to put all demands on the table. 
Vali chose to go back to the informal hearing. Yet even then 
Vali did not raise the issue of interest before the informal 
hearing officer. Vali's reason for not raising the issue of 
interest at that point clearly shows that Vali was aware that DOH 
would not compromise further if interest were claimed. Mr. Brown 
said that he did not want to boil the pot, that if he had raised 
the issue it would have been much more difficult to get a 
settlement and that he would probably still be without a 
settlement if he raised that issue. Indeed it is likely that he 
would have still been without a settlement, for DOH would not 
have been willing to further compromise the claim if Vali also 
claimed interest. 
Furthermore, Vali's claim that it reserved the right to 
claim interest also flies in the face of the other facts and of 
other claims made by Vali. For example, there is absolutely no 
reference in the record in regard to the time prior to the 
settlement agreement, including the testimony of DOH's attorney 
and audit manager, where Vali reserved the right to interest or 
where Vali made it clear that it would seek interest on the 
settlement amount. On the contrary every witness from the 
Department of Health that testified at the formal hearing 
emphatically stated that they considered the settlement to be 
final. None of them thought Vali had reserved a claim for 
interest or were aware that Vali intended to claim interest on 
the settlement amount, including the audit manager and the 
attorney. It is also significant that Mr. Brown, the only other 
witness to testify, also made no mention in his testimony at the 
formal hearing of any claim that he had specifically reserved the 
right to interest prior to the settlement agreement. 
Moreover, the informal hearing officer was the DOH 
representative who was authorized to negotiate a settlement in 
behalf of DOH. It was he who finalized the settlement 
negotiations and made the offer. If Vali intended to reserve a 
right to interest, it is the informal hearing officer that Vali 
should have told. There is absolutely no evidence that shows 
that Vali even mentioned the topic of interest to the informal 
hearing officer until after the settlement was entered into. To 
the contrary, Mr. Brown stated that the issue of interest was not 
raised in the informal hearing because he didn't want to boil the 
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pot and because he thought it would be more difficult to get a 
settlement if he claimed interest. The evidence set forth above, 
when considered together with Vali's admission in its Petition 
for Review that it intentionally did not raise the issue of 
interest in the exit conferences and informal hearings because it 
intended to raise the issue at a formal hearing, makes it fairly 
obvious that Vali did not reserve a right to interest prior to 
entering the settlement agreement and that Vali's strategy was to 
string DOH along and get as favorable a compromise as possible 
and then assert a claim for interest. And that's exactly what 
they didf however unfair it may have been. 
POINT III 
IT IS THE MARCH 22, 1985 
AGREEMENT THAT IS CONTROLLING 
AND THAT AGREEMENT WAS FOR 
COMPLETE AND FINAL SETTLEMENT. 
Vali has repeatedly attempted to divert the Court's 
attention away from the March 22, 1985 agreement and toward the 
May 16, 1985 acceptance of the $274,000.00 check by 
mischaracterizing DOH's argument. That, of course, is because 
Vali did not raise the issue of interest prior to accepting DOH's 
March 22 proposal for final settlement but Vali did bring up the 
issue of interest prior to acceptance of that check. Vali's 
tactic was successful in the district court. Judge Murphy never 
did rule on DOH's claims regarding the March 22 agreement. 
It is the March 22 date that is controlling. Vali 
accepted the DOH offer for final settlement on that date without, 
reservation. Vali could not reserve an issue after it had 
entered an agreement for final settlement. 
Furthermore, the May 13 meeting regarding interest did 
not alter what the parties had already done. The result of that 
meeting was an agreement to disagree. Vali held fast to its 
position that it had not settled interest and DOH held fast to 
its position that the settlement proposal was offered as full and 
final settlement and that Vali's acceptance of that offer 
precluded a later claim for interest. The parties agreed to hold 
fast to their respective positions and to submit the question as 
to who was right to a formal hearing. Thereafter the parties 
tried to find wording for a restrictive endorsement that was 
acceptable to both parties so that the check could be released 
pursuant to that understanding. The informal hearing officer 
summarized the result of the May 13 meeting as follows: 
. . . when we left the meeting, it was—it 
was agreed by both parties to my 
understanding that there would be a 
statement to the effect that this would 
constitute final settlement on all issues 
raised in the informal hearing and resolved 
through the informal hearing. The State's 
position was the informal hearing resolved 
all issues. And Mr. Brown's position wasf 
because interest was not specifically 
addressed in the informal hearing, it would 
not be covered by that statement. 
Thus DOH tendered the check pursuant to its claim that the 
compromised settlement agreement was final and precluded a later 
claim for interest and Vali accepted the check pursuant to its 
claim that the settlement agreement did not settle the question 
of interest. Hence, the bottom line question relates back to 
just what the meaning and effect of the March 22, 1985 agreement 
was. 
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From the very start of the informal hearings and exit 
conferences it was clear that the parties were trying to reach a 
final resolution. Vali had sold its facilities and the parties 
were attempting to wind up their dealings with each other. 
If there was any cause to question whether DOH was 
trying to reach a complete and final resolve prior to the parties 
communications regarding the $185,000.00 check, there certainly 
was no cause to question that thereafter. DOH clearly expressed 
to Vali that the check "was in fact settlement in full for all 
outstanding issues with the exception of retro nursing" Stip. of 
Facts, Exhibit D. The informal hearinq officer then gave Vali 
the option to accept the check as payment in full for all issues 
except retro nursing or return the check and resume the hearing 
process. Vali understood the offer to be for final settlement as 
is evidenced by Mr., Brown's testimony as to why he did not accept 
the check, as set forth above. Even though Vali understood the 
hearing officer was making an offer for final settlement, the 
acceptance of which would preclude a later claim for interest, 
Vali still did not make the hearing officer aware that Vali 
wanted to reserve the issue of interest when it resumed the 
informal hearing process. 
There is nothing in the record that would give Vali 
cause to believe that the DOH settlement offer of March 20, 1985 
was intended to be any less final than the offer associated with 
the $185,000.00 check was. Indeed, the March 20 offer even 
settled the one issue that was excepted from the $185,000.00 
offer, so Vali had all the more cause to know that the March 20 
offer was an offer for final settlement of all issues. 
-1 R_ 
Furthermore, the March 20 offer was clearly an offer 
for final settlement of all issues by its own terms• Mr. Brown 
had the option to accept it or reject it. He accepted the offer 
without reservation and even acknowledged that it would dispose 
of every issue between him and DOH and that they would not have 
to deal with each other over money again, all of which is set 
forth more fully in DOH's prior brief. The March 22, 1985 
settlement agreement was clearly an agreement for full and final 
settlement of all issues. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no question that there was a settlement 
between the parties. Both parties claim that there was. The 
evidence clearly shows that there was a great deal of compromise 
on the part of both parties. The evidence is clear that the 
settlement agreement of March 22, 1985 was an agreement for final 
settlement that resolved all issues. The settlement offer was 
clearly an offer for final settlement and it was accepted without 
reservation. Having entered into an agreement for final 
settlement, Vali could not thereafter raise an enforceable claim 
for interest for the period prior to the settlement agreement. 
For the many reasons cited on pp. 19-21 of DOH's prior 
brief in this case, it is not only unlawful, it is also 
manifestly unfair to allow one party to string the other party 
along to get as favorable a compromise as possible and then to 
assert an additional claim for interest after the parties have 
entered into an agreement for final settlement. It is clear from 
Mr. Brown's testimony that he knew full well that if he had 
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boiled the pot with the interest issue DOH would not have been as 
willing to compromise and may not have been willing to reach a 
compromised settlement at all. Had Vali raised the issue of 
interest prior to its acceptance of the offer for final 
settlement, DOH would likely have exercised the right it retained 
in the settlement offer to scrap the whole settlement agreement 
if the proposal was not accepted. After Vali had accepted the 
settlement offer, however, there was an enforceable agreement 
that DOH felt bound to comply with. Furthermore, DOH had been 
trying for years to get the matter settled and the files closed. 
Though DOH had compromised a great deal, DOH was not anxious to 
start that whole miserable process over or to go into possibly 
lengthy litigation. Rather than waste additional resources, DOH 
sought to enforce the agreement that it had worked in good faith 
to achieve. 
Moreover Vali has not cited one case where interest was 
claimed and ordered on a settlement amount that had been 
determined by a compromise between the parties. Indeed, it is 
highly doubtful that such a case exists, not only because of the 
manifest injustice of assessing interest on a questionable claim 
but also because 
[a] valid compromise and settlement is 
final, conclusive, and binding upon the 
parties . . . and, regardless of what the 
actual merits of the antecedent claim may 
have been, they will not afterward be 
inquired into and examined . . . . 
The compromise agreement is substituted for 
the antecedent claim or right, and the 
rights and liabilities of the parties are 
measured and limited by the terms of the 
agreement. The antecedent claim is 
extinguished, and subsequent litigation 
based upon it is barred by the compromise 
and settlement. 
15a Am Jur 2d Compromise and Settlement §§ 24, 25. 
Hence, because the settlement agreement extinguishes 
the prior agreement and because the rights and liabilities of the 
parties are determined by the settlement agreement, even if the 
Court were to rule that the settlement agreement herein settled 
only the principal amount, Vali would still be entitled to 
interest on the settlement amount only from the date payment of 
the settlement amount was due up to and including the date it was 
paid. 
For the many reasons set forth above and in DOH's prior 
brief, DOH respectfully requests that this honorable Court affirm 
the Final Determination of the Executive Director of the 
Department of Health that there was a binding settlement 
agreement between the parties that prevents Vali's later claim 
for interest. 
DATED this UiK day of July, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
BRIAN L. FARR 
Assistant Attorney General 
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